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those of the 1920s and early 1930s, many farm groups
have supported such restrictive policies in the past
and continue to support them today.
FARM EXPORTS ASSOCIATED
WITH TOTAL IMPORTS
Farm exports tend to move in the same direction
as total exports, and both tend to move in the same
direction as total imports. Chart 1 shows that, aside
from World War II and the immediate post-war years
when foreign aid was a major portion of total ex-
ports, exports and imports as a percent of GNP gen-
erally have moved in the same direction. Chart 2
shows the same general movements for exports of
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EXPORTS of farm commodities in 1978 totaled
$29.4 billion, almost 27 percent of the value of all
cash farm receipts, and a further increase in farm
exports is expected this year. Farm exports have in-
creased rapidly and consistently during the past
decade both in nominal value and as a percent of
cash farm receipts. The nominal value of such ex-
ports last year was more than five times that of
1989 and such exports, as a percent of cash farm
receipts, more than doubled over the period. Despite
this sharp increase, however, farm exports as a per-
cent of cash farm receipts have only recently regained
the levels that existed in the early 1920s.
much of the increase in This article suggests that
the proportion of farm
products exported in re-
cent years is a result of
major changes in U.S. and
other nations’ foreign trade
policies. The restrictive
trade legislation of the
1920sand 1930s sharply re-
duced imports which, cou-
pled with retaliatory re-
strictions imposed by other
nations, also reduced U.S.
exports. This reduction
hurt the farm sector se-
verely (see box). This arti-
cle further demonstrates
that despite the damage to
farmers caused by restric-
tive trade policies such as
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farm products as a percent of cash farm receipts. Sta-
tistical analysis confirms these relationships; the
changes in imports and exports are highly positively
correlated as are the changes in farm exports and
total imports.1
Given constant levels of real income in the trad-
ing nations, two factors tend to produce similar
movements in exports and imports of goods and sen’-
ices. First, tariff changes by one nation usually are
reciprocated by other nations. For example, following
the enactment of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930,
higher U.S. duties on imports were quickly followed
by higher import duties in Canada, Cuba, Mexico,
France, Italy, Spain, Australia, and New Zealand.
The following year India, Peru, Argentina, Brazil, and
China also levied higher duties.2
Second, under a flexible exchange rate system,
movements in the exchange rate tend to balance
1
The annual change in exports of goods and services over the
period 1901-78, excluding the years of 1939-50, is positively
correlated with the change in imports; the correlation coeffi-
cient is .88. Over periods longer than a year, the correlation
of changes in imports and exports is even higher. Using two-
year averages, the correlation coefficient is .93 and with five-
year averages, the correlation is .99. Similarly, the annual
change in farm exports is positively correlated with the change
in total imports; the correlation coefficient is .69. Using two-
year and five-year averages, the correlation coefficients are .77
and .93, respectively.
21). T. Ellsworth, The Intenuitional Economy (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1950), p. 501, and Allan H. Meltzer,
“Monetary and Other Explanations of the Start of the Great
Depression,” Journal of Monetanj Economics (November
1976), p. 460.
trade over an extended period of time even without
reciprocity of tariff rate changes. The exchange rate
— the value of the dollar in terms of other currencies
— like the price of any other good, is determined by
the supply and demand for dollars, Over a period
of time, changes in the supply of dollars in foreign
exchange markets reflect the value of U.S. imports
plus U.S. investments abroad. When such imports
and investments rise relative to U.S. exports plus
foreign investments in the United States, the supply
of dollars in foreign exchange markets increases rela-
tive to the demand for dollars and the exchange value
of the dollar falls. Conversely, when exports of U.S.
commodities and foreign investments in the United
States rise, the quantity of dollars supplied to foreign
exchange markets decreases and the exchange value
of the dollar in these markets rises.
These fluctuations in the value of the dollar tend
to equate the dollar value of U.S. exports and imports
through the domesticcurrency prices of internationally
traded goods.3 For example, if the value of the dollar
3
In contrast to the current method in which trade plus net
investment flows are balanced between nations, under the gold
and gold exchange standards, the flows were balanced through
gold specie or gold bullion transfers. During those periods in
which the stock of money in a nation was infinenced by the
quantity of gold held, the flow of specie or bullion out of a
nation in payment for excess imports led to a reduction in
domestic prices relative to world prices and thereby to a
reversal in trade and the balance ot payments. During much
of the gold exchange standard period following 1933, revi-
sions in the exchange rates were made by governments in
response to unequal rates of inflation in the various nations.
Such revisions often served to reverse imbalances in trade.
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falls relative to the value of the Japanese yen, prices of
Japanese television sets to U.S. consumers will rise;
consequently, fewer Japanese television sets will be
purchased. But the Japanese, finding that U.S. wheat
and soybeans can be purchased for fewer yen, will
import more of these products. Similarly, if the value
of the U.S. dollar falls relative to all foreign curren-
cies, foreign residents will find U.S. goods cheaper
than before, and U.S. exports will increase. Con-
versely, if the value of the dollar rises relative to
other currencies, U.S. citizens will find that the dollar
prices of foreign goods have fallen relative to U.S.
goods, and imports will increase.4 Given the tendency
for the exchange rate mechanism to equate the dollar
value of exports and imports, attempts to reduce im-
ports will have a similar effect on the demand for
exports including exports of farm products.
RESTRICTIVE IMPORT POLICIES LED
TO DECLINES IN TOTAL IMPORTS,
FARM EXPORTS, AND FARM INCOME
As shown in Chart 2, exports as a percent of cash
farm receipts declined throughout most of the twenties
4
While Kravis and Lipsey found sizable differences in the do!-
lar prices of foreign traded goods in various countries for an
extended period of time, exports rose at the highest rate in
those nations where prices were lowest. I. B. Kravis and H. E.
Lipsey, “Price Behavior irs the Light of Balance of Payment
and thirties from an average of 25.2 percent in 1920-
22, to 13.4 percent in 1930-32, to 8.4 percent in 1938-
40. This decline in exports followed the adoption of
more restrictive trade policies by the United States
and other countries. The sharp decline in farm com-
modity prices in 1921, which followed the domestic
business recession and the European agricultural re-
covery from World War I, prompted Congress to
attempt to “protect” farmers with an emergency tariff
on farm products. The duties on wheat, corn, meat,
wool and sugar were raised. In 1922 the Fordney-
McCumber Tariff Bill was enacted, raising the aver-
age ad valorem (percent of value) rates on dutiable
imports to about 40 percent — back to the levels of
1913. Duties were increased on numerous farm prod-
ucts including wheat, corn, beef, eggs, reindeer meat,
peanuts, beet and cane sugar, wool, and acorns. Ad-
ditional “concessions” to farmers were the removal of
duties on agricultural implements such as plows, har-
rows, reapers, cotton gins, etc. The Smoot-Hawley Tar-
iff Act of 1930, initiated as another measure for “pro-
tecting” agriculture from foreign competition, raised
import duties to the highest levels in the nation’s his-
Theories,” Journal of International Economics (May 1978),
p. 230. Henry Goldstein found that relative domestic price
levels have a substantial and significant impact on the ex-
change rate. See “Floating Exchange Rates and Modified Pur-
chasing Power Parity: Evidence from Recent Experience Us-
ing an Index of Effective Exchange Rates” published in West
Coast Academic/Federal Reserve Economic Research, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1978, p. 174.
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Decline in Imports Following Tariff Acts of 1922 and 1930
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tory. Although already high by historical standards,
rates were further increased on more than 800 items,5
The initial 1921 emergency tariffhad little effect on
the volume of foreign trade or on farm commodity
exports. The United States was a net exporter of most
of the commodities being protected and remained so.
Hence, the protective features of the act were largely
illusory. The Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act in 1922
and the Smoot-Hawley Act in 1930, however, signifi-
cantly reduced import growth, thereby setting in mo-
tion forces that reduced exports of farm products.
Imports as a percent of GNP declined from 7.3 per-
cent in 1920 to about 5.4 percent in 1922. They re-
mained near that level until 1930 when they declined
even further as a result of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
and the Great Depression. They dropped to 3.6 percent
of GNP in 1932 and remained near this level through-
out the remainder of the decade (Chart 1). Total
exports followed the same general pattern. Exports
of farm products, however, declined faster than ex-
ports of noafarm products as farmers in other nations
~F. W. Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States
(New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967), pp. 452, 455, 504-11.
Rates were increased on numerous farm products including
sugar, cotton, cattle, beef, sheep, mutton, swine, corn, milk,
cream, eggs, live poultry, hides, leather, onions, tomatoes,
cabbages, turnips, and blueberries.
demanded and generally received greater
protection than the nonfarm sector. Farm
exports declined from 22 percent of cash
farm receipts in 1922 to: 8.4 percent in
1938.
One statistical study of U.S. demand
for imports found evidence that the tar-
iffs were a major factor in the decline of
imports during the 1920s andearly 1930s.
The study demonstrated that the tariffs
caused a greater reduction in dutiable
imports (imports on which tariffs were
levied) than in duty-free imports. After
eliminating the effects of shifts in im-
ports from duty-free to dutiable, and
vice versa, the study found that dutiable
imports as a percent of duty-free imports
declined sharply following the higher
duties in both 1922 and 1930 (Chart 3).
During the three years following the
1922 Act, the index of the quantity of
dutiable imports declined to 77 percent
of the index of duty-free imports, and
in the three years following the 1930
Act, the index of dutiable imports declined further
to 53 percent of the duty-free imports.6 Since exports
are closely associated with imports, the tariffs were
indirectly a major factor in the decline of farm
exports.
Since exports accounted for such a large portion of
U.S. farm commodity sales (15 percent in 1929), the
decline in farm exports had a greater impact on farm
income than the decline in nonfarm exports had on
income in the nonfarm sector. Hence, farm incomes
declined more dramatically than did nonfarm income.
For example, farm income declined at an average an-
nual rate of 31 percent during the 1929-32 period,
compared with a 17 percent rate for total personal
income.
if the tariff accounted for the difference between
the percentage decline in total personal income and
farm income during the period, about 40 percent of
the decline in fann income during 1929-32 can be
attributed to it. If farm income had declined only at
the rate of the national aggregates, net farm income
in 1932 would have totaled about $3.6 billion instead
of $2.0 billion.
6J. Hans Adler, “United States Import Demand During the
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RISING FARM EXPORTS AND INCOMES
FOLLOWED FREER TRADE POLICIES
Much of the increase in farm exports since the
mid-1950s can be attributed to a gradual reduction
in foreign trade restrictions.t Beginning with the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, a series of
tariff-reducing acts and negotiations have led to major
reductions in international trade barriers. Initially,
these bilateral reductions achieved only limited suc-
cess since duties on most dutiable imports were well
above the minimum levels that provided incentives
for trade.
Since the war and the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GAn) in 1947, a number of major
reductions in avenge ad valorem rates have been
negotiated. The permissible reductions and average
duties on dutiable imports are listed in Tables I
and H.
Studies indicate that these reductions have had a
major impact on U.S. imports. Kreinin analyzed the
effect of the tariff reductions granted in the 1955
negotiations (which resulted in a2 8percent reduc-
tion in the 1954 rates on the covered group of com-
modities) and found that the volume of imports of
commodities on which tariffs were reduced rose 59
percent, whereas imports of the nonreduced group
rose only 17 percent. Similarly, following the 1956
negotiations (which resulted in a 15 percent reduction
in rates for the affected group), imports of the re-
duced group increased 12 percentage points more
than the nonreduced group-°
A study by Stern, based on the import demand for
226 commodity groups, concluded that total imports
in 1960 would have been $4.1 billion (about 25 per-
cent) more than the actual level had no tariffs or
quotas existed.9 A study in 1965 by Balassa found
t
Domestic price support programs and crop production con-
trols, which caused the prices of some products to rise above
free market levels, were factors that tended to reduce exports
of some crops, especially wheat, cotton, and tobacco. These
supports and controls, however, had little impact on the prices
of such major export crops as feed grain and soybeans,
indicating that the removal of trade restrictions was a major
factor in the rise in exports of these products. U.S. Govern-
ment holdings of feed grain and soybeans through price
support operations did not exceed 15 percent and 30 percent
of production, respectively, at the close of any year follow-
ing 1963. Furthermore, the holdings of both were almost as
large in the recent years of rising exports as in the early
1960s.
8Mordechai E. Icreinin, “Effect of Tariff Changes on the
Value and Volume of Imports,” American Economic Review
(June 1961), pp. 314-16.
°RobertM. Stem, “The U.S. Tariff and the Efficiency of the
U.S. Economy,” American Economic Review (May 1984),
p. 464.
Table I
Tariff Cuts Authorized by the Various Trade Acts
Trade Agreements Acts Maximum Permissible Reduction
Act of 1934 50 percent of July 1 • 1934 rate
Act of 1945 50 percent of January 1, 1945 rote
Ac, of 1955 IS percent of January I • 1955 rate
Act of 1958 20 percent of July 1, 1958 rate
Act of 1962 50 percent of July I, 1962 rate
Act of 1974 60 percent o~ existing rate
soi;a~ E United Stateo Thrift commission.
Table II
Average level of Tariffs an Imports
Ratio of Dutien Collected to:
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Table III
Congressional Vote on the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930
Percent of Workers
In In Representatives Senators
Section of Nation Agriculture Manuacturing For Against For Against
New England 6.2% 43.1% 27 3 ii 1
Middle Atlantic 5.3 36.3 64 27 42
East North Central 14.4 35.7 60 21 8 2
West North Central 33.6 19.8 33 23 3 11
South Atlantic 32.5 24.2 14 39 79
East South Central 47.8 16.9 8 30 1 7
West South Central 40.5 16.9 ii 3D 2 6
Mountain 30.8 18.3 ii 28 8
Pacific 14.5 26.1 IS 1 5 I
United States 21.4 28.9 246 176 49 47
SOURCE: u.s.. congress, Cen,srer:si’,,,ai flrcu,-d, and (1.5. Dtpartrner.t of (‘osc,mcree.
1950s were well above the minimum prohibitive trade 15 percent in the 1960s, to about 25 percent since the
level (the tarifflevel at svhich no trade will occur) and mid-1970s.
the reductions only reduced the excess protection.
Furthermore, as lower rates provided incentives for
trade, foreign producers still needed time to arrange
for merchandising and distributing facilities in the
United States. Exporters of goods to the United States
had been effectively shut out of the U.S. market for
about 25 years — in the l930s because of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff, in the 1940s because of the war, and
in the early 1950s because of the time required to pre-
pare for increased exports.” THE FARM SECTOR HAS NOT
CO?SISTENTLY OPPOSED
RESTRICTIVE TRADE POLICIES
Despite the fact that protective tariffs have gen-
erally harmed the well-being of farmers, elected rep-
resentatives from major farming states have in some
cases supported highly protective tariff legislation.
Such support apparently was obtained by imposing
duties on imports of farm products that would not
have been imported even without tariffs and exempt-
ing farm implement imports from tariffs even though
none were imported anyway. The Secretary of Agri-
culture’s report to the President in late 1930 pointed
out these “favorable” aspects of the Smoot-Hawley
Tariff Act. He showed that the schedule for farm
products was increased an average of 69 percent,
whereas all schedules were increased an average of
only 20 percent. He argued that a protective tariff
must become a more integral part of our national
agricultural policy.’2 Such arguments apparently
gained support for the Act.
12U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture
1931 (Govermnent Printing Office, 1931), p. 42-44.
The sharp increase in farm exports had a favorable
effect on farm income. Gross farm income rose at an
8.4 percent rate from 1969 to 1978, about the same
rate as GNP growth. In contrast, during the previous
10 years when farm exports were rising more slowly,
gross farm income rose only 4.0 percent per year com-
pared with a 6.8 percent rate of GNP growth.
By the mid-1950s, U.S. tariff rates on a large num-
ber of commodities had been reduced to a level
which provided incentives for trade, and several
international organizations were established to in-
crease exports to the United States. Imports of goods
and services as a percent of GNP increased moder-
ately in the early 1960s from 4,5 percent to 6 per-
cent in 1970 and to 10 percent in 1978 (Chart 1).
By 1978, imports as a percent of GNP were the
largest for any year since the turn of the century.
Total exports and farm commodity exports followed
the pattern of total imports. As a percent of GNP
and of farm cash receipts, respectively, they started
up in the 1950s, continued moderately up through
the 1960s, and rose at a sharply higher rate in the
1970s. Exports of farm products rose from about 10
percent of cash receipts in the early 1950s, to about
“Kreinin, “Effect of Tariff Changes,” p. 319; also William P.
Travis in “Production, Trade and Protection When There
Are Many Commodities and Two Factors,” American Eco-
nomic Review (March 1972), pp. 100-02.
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The voting record in Congress indicates that sizable
support for this highly protectionist measure came
from some of the leading farm states. The House of
Representatives opposed the act in only three of the
nine major sections of the nation, and the Senate
opposed it in only four. The vote in the Senate, how-
ever, was close (Table III). Support for the act was
strongest in New England and the Middle Atlantic
states, where the percentage of workers in agricul-
ture was relatively small and the percentage in man-
ufacturing relatively large. The proportion of workers
in agriculture averaged 6.2 and 5.3 percent, respec-
tively, in the two regions. On the other hand, a
majority of representatives supported the act in such
agricultural areas as the West North Central and
Mountain states, and large majorities supported it in
both the House and Senate in the Pacific states.
RESTRICTIVE POLICIES STILL
RECEIVE MUCH FARM SUPPORT
Despite the major shrinkage both in the market for
U.S. farm products and in farm income resulting from
the ill-advised tariff of 1930, and despite the expansion
of exports following the reduced tariffs in the 1950s
and 1960s, recent actions of farm groups are not un-
equivocally opposed to protectionist policies. Evidence
indicates that farmers still are sensitive to possible in-
creases in agricultural imports. Organized and highly
articulate groups of farmers, while largely interested
in the protection of specific farm products, still sup-
port foreign trade policies which would result in high
tariffs for farm products in general.
Sugar cane and sugar beet producers, for example,
still insist on legislation to maintain domestic prices
above world prices and to protect growers from “low-
price” foreign sugar.’8 The National Livestock Feeders
Association has gone on record against the “ivory
tower” free trade philosophy that has characterized
U.S. trade policy for the past several years. The ex-
ecutive vice president of the association, in hearings
before the Senate Committee on Finance in 1974,
argued that our free trade policy has brought irre-
parable harm to U.S. agriculture and industry and
opposed proposed legislation to “wipe out” any duty
of not more than 5 percent ad valorem, since this
would permit the free entry of a number of meat
products.’4 Despite his contention that the U.S. dairy
13See John Valentine, “President’s Sugar Price-Support Plan
Welcomed as End to a Key Uncertainty,’ The Wall Street
Journal, February 21, 1979.
14U.5., Congress, Senate, Committee on Finance, The Trade
fleform Act of 1973, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., March 25, 1974,
pp. 947-84.
industry is, as a whole, among the most efficient in-
dustries in the world, the secretary of the National
Milk Producers Federation argued strongly against
free trade. He stated in the above hearings: “Despite
all the fine sounds of free trade and expanded inter-
national cooperation we must first take stock of our
own national interests.”15 While reaffirming the Na-
tional Farmers Union’s traditional position in support
of expanding foreign trade, its national secretary in
the same hearings opposed any further reduction of
tariff and nontariff barriers. He contended that fur-
ther reductions in trade restrictions would undermine
farm prices in both the United States and the Euro-
pean Economic Community.~eThe American Farm
Bureau Federation, although making a strong state-
ment for free trade in general, recommended at the
hearings that Title TI of the act be amended so that
farmers could more readily obtain relief from injury
caused by import competition.’7
The Agricultural Adjustment Act is indicative of the
strong support for protection for specific farm prod-
ucts, delegating sufficient authority to limit the im-
ports of almost any product that is competitive with
U.S. farm products. The act directs the Secretary of
Agriculture to advise the President when he believes
that any farm commodity or product is being im-
ported in quantities that will interfere with farm price
support or other USDA programs. The President may
then direct the International Trade Commission to
conduct an investigation, after which he may pro-
claim new duties or quantitative restrictions on the
imports.’8
The maintenance of such a pattern of protection
for farm commodities places this nation in an unfav-
orable bargaining position for free trade in farm
commodities. The United States has just concluded
the Tokyo Round of negotiations which will take ef-
fect starting in January 1980. In these negotiations,
the United States obtained a broad range of tariff
and nontariff concessions that are expected to sig-
nificantly increase agricultural exports over the next
decade. Among those products on which trade bar-
riers were reduced are beef, pork, poultry, tobacco,
fruit, vegetables, oilseeds, and nuts.’° Nevertheless,




8united States International Trade Commission, “Operation
of the Trade Agreements Program,” 26th Report, 1974,
p. 32.
‘“U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Outlook (May
1979), p. 10.
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cult of all restrictions to remove. For this reason, a
positive view toward free trade in farm products by
this nation is highly desirable.
The argument often given in support of farm com-
modity protection is that this country has lower duties
on farm products than most other nations. This argu-
ment, however, is meaningless in view of our com-
parative advantage in production. A more appro-
priate way of measuring relative duties is to compare
this nation’s duties on farm products with other na-
tions’ duties on products in which they have a com-
parative advantage. In only a few farm commodities,
such as sugar and wool where we do not have a com-
parative advantage, is such a comparison with other
nations meaningful. Significantly, our policies with re-
spect to sugar cannot be considered liberal by either
foreign producers or domestic consumers. Apparently
the farm sector is willing to accept free trade policies
only if “reasonable” restraints are established on im-
ports of competitive products. Such a posture, if all
nations maintained it at the bargaining table, would
not permit the resource adjustments necessary for
trade or for the attainment of the potential gains to
U.S. agriculture from exports.
Given the U.S.’s comparative advantage in the pro-
duction of farm products, most farmers have little to
fear from imports. The alleged protection for crops
such as wheat, rice, corn, cotton, soybeans, tobacco,
and livestock products, where net exports are realized,
is actually little protection. Such products are gener-
ally more valuable when exported and when the pro-
ceeds are exchanged for foreign goodsthan when sold
on the domestic market; hence, these products will
not be imported except possibly along the Canadian
or Mexican borders which have special transportation
advantages.
Protection for other major products that may ex-
perience minor competition from imports (such as
beef, other processed and frozen meats, and dairy
products) could be self-defeating, especially if such
regulations trigger retaliatory protective measures
abroad. Any loss of foreign markets for the major ex-
ported crops, such as cotton, tobacco, wheat, feed
grain, soybeans, and rice, will lead to lower domestic
prices for such products and eventually will result
in a shift of farm resources from these products into
the production of tariff-protected products such as
beef, other meats, and dairy products. In other words,
those sectors which experience minor competition from
imports under free trade practices would realize more
competition from domestic farmers whose products
can no longer be sold in the export market.
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Another argument often made for protection is
that, given a protected market for industrial goods,
we will have more workers employed by nonfarm
industries and an expanded domestic market for farm
products.2°With such policies, however, gains from
international specialization of labor and resource use
would be lost. In other words, each nation without
trade must depend upon its own resources for the
production of each good even though it may be rela-
tively inefficient in producing some goods. The total
quantity of goods available for consumption will thus
be less for both farm and nonfarm sectors without
trade than with trade. Consequently, it is inconsis-
tent with the general well-being of the farm sector,
as well as the nation at large, for farm groups to pur-
sue protectionist policies.
SUMMARY
The U.S. farm sector potentially has more to gain
from free international trade than virtually any other
sector of the economy. Exports of farm products con-
stitute about 30 percent of the market for U.S. farm
products. In contrast, exports account for less than
10 percent of the value of manufactured goods. Never-
theless, many farm groups have left a record of con-
fusion with respect to their position on foreign trade
policies.
They have failed to recognize the link between
imports and exports. Changes in imports are closely
associated with changes in total U.S. exports. Conse-
quently, they are closely associated with the level of
farm exports given the comparative advantage of the
United States in farm production. U.S. imports pro-
vide foreigners with income to purchase U.S. farm
products. Free trade policies, therefore, tend to di-
rectly increase imports and thereby enhance farm
commodity exports. In addition, they induce other
nations to adopt similar policies which further en-
hance trade.
2011 domestic price supports and production controls were a
major factor in the current levels of farm incomes, it could
be argued that farmers are making rational decisions in
trading some of their foreign market exports for the
short-run gains from domestic price supports. Such supports,
however, have been much smaller in recent years relative
to farm income, and losses in the export market from pro-
tectionist policies would not likely be offset. Only relatively
small sectors of the agricultural industry (largely sugar and
tobacco producers) have received major benefits from the
price supports and production controls in recent years. Fur-
thermore, prior to 1933, when farm support for protective
tariffs was perhaps as great or greater than today, the na-
tion had no farm production controls and no price supports
for most farm products.